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The Impact of Labor Reallocation and Competitive Pressure on TFP Growth:  







This paper uses the natural experiment of a macro-financial crisis and radical liberalization in 
Bulgaria to explore the impact of labor reallocation and competitive pressure on Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) growth in the manufacturing sector. Our results indicate that labor reallocated 
from less efficient to more efficient firms in virtually all industries but the influence of other 
within industry characteristics on TFP growth was significantly higher. Furthermore, while 
increased competitive pressure had a positive impact on TFP growth among relative laggards in 
the respective industries, this impact was more than overwhelmed by the inability of industrial 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The link between economic liberalization and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth has long 
been one of the most prolific areas of microeconomic research in both developed and developing 
countries. On the one hand, economists have explored the process of Schumpeterian creative 
destruction, whereby key productive resources such as labor move from less productive to more 
productive firms as the former downsize and exit and the latter prosper and expand operations 
(Olley and Pakes, 1996; Roberts and Tybout, 1996). On the other hand, they have studied the 
increase in firm and industrial productivity by way of improvements in X-efficiency, investment 
in catching up activities by technologically backward producers and innovation by technological 
leaders (Levinsohn, 1993, Nickell, 1996; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Aghion, Harris and Vickers, 
1997).  
               Although economic theory provides numerous arguments in favour of a positive impact 
of liberalization on productivity, empirical evidence is not straightforward. For example, the 
question still remains as to whether high job and employment turnover is necessarily efficiency 
enhancing and/or simply a reflection of volatile environment and large number of small entrants 
that emerge and die out frequently out of inability to graduate and compete with large entrenched 
conglomerates (Swanson and Tybout, 1988; Levinsohn, 1999; Roberts and Tybout, 1996). 
Similarly, while increased market pressure has often been found to contribute to X-efficiency 
improvement (Levinsohn, 1993; Nickell, 1996), doubts remain of whether it also leads to 
increased economies of scale and R&D investment in emerging industrial sectors (Rodrik, 1992; 
Pack, 1988).  
Theoretical and empirical studies on developed economies have recently challenged the 
neo-Schumpeterian view that increased competition is likely to discourage innovation by wiping 
out the rents of potential investors (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Rodrik, 1992). They have shown 
that a scenario where laggards imitate and catch up with industrial leaders before aspiring for   5
leadership in the future while leaders innovate in order to avoid neck-and-neck competition leads 
to a positive link between competition and innovation among firms close to the technological 
frontier (Aghion, Harris and Vickers, 1997; Aghion et al, 2001; Konings and Vanderbusche, 
2004; Aghion et al, 2005).  
Evidence from developing countries, on the other hand, often argues against this logic. 
Handoussa, Nishimizu and Page (1986) for instance show that in the process of liberalization in 
Egypt, once-and-for-all improvement in TFP took place as a result of movement of relatively 
inefficient firms towards the technological frontier. TFP improvement ceased once these less 
efficient firms reached the frontier, while the firms that were originally at the frontier failed to 
improve their technological performance.  
                    This paper attempts to throw light on some unanswered questions by exploring the 
potential impacts of two important consequences of post-crisis liberalization in Bulgaria on TFP, 
namely increased employment turnover and competitive pressure. We find the Bulgarian volatile 
environment of 1995-2001 particularly interesting due to the clear demarcation of a lacklustre 
pre-crisis period, macro-financial crisis and post-crisis rapid liberalization. While the CEE 
countries that joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 reached the trough of their output loss in 
1991-92 and were able to contain inflation by 1993; Bulgaria’s GDP continued to fall through 
1993, and hyperinflation was witnessed as late as 1997. This lacklustre performance relative to 
most other CEE countries was largely a result of the absence of reform until the macro-financial 
crisis of 1996-97, accompanied by one of the most dramatic mid-1990 depressions in the history 
of the CEE economies.  
  In reaction to the crisis the government initiated radical reforms that targeted both 
macroeconomic stability and structural changes. By the end of the 1990s, explicit subsidies 
reached a level below the EU average of 1.7 percent (World Bank, 2001) and the private sector’s 
contribution increased to 70 percent of the GDP (Commission of the European Communities, 
2001, IMF, 1999, 2000). The denationalization of public property was supplemented by high   6
level of internal and external liberalization of the economy 
i, such that by 1998 Bulgaria was 
ranked in the top 5 percentile among IMF member countries in terms of liberalization. 
Liberalization was rewarded by significant FDI inflow, the inflow during 1997-99 alone 
exceeding by 80 percent the entire stock of FDI attracted during the 1991-96 period (World Bank, 
2001).  
         These positive developments did not remove the doubts associated with industrial revival 
and TFP growth. For example, while the net job destruction in more advanced CEE economies 
like Hungary and Poland, reached an equilibrium level of approximately zero, in Bulgaria, during 
1997-2001, net job destruction continued to be positive and significant, raising doubts about the 
Schumpeterian character of labor reallocation (Bilsen and Konings, 1998; Garibaldi, Makovec 
and Stoyanova, 2001; Rutkowski, 2003, Havlik, 2004). Agency problems as a result of a 
suboptimal mix of mass and cash privatization strategies (Miller and Petranov, 2000), together 
with one of the most impressive incidences of credit crunch among the CEE economies raise 
further questions about the ability of firms to survive increased internal and external competition 
and embark on productivity enhancing policies (IMF, 2002). In other words, the Bulgarian 
experience provides an interesting natural experiment for the analysis of labor reallocation and 
increased competitive pressure on TFP growth at the firm and industry level.  
Our results indicate that in the environment of macro-financial crisis and structural 
reform in Bulgaria labor reallocated from less efficient to more efficient firms in virtually all 
manufacturing sectors but the influence of other within industry characteristics on TFP growth 
was significantly higher. Furthermore, while increased competitive pressure had a positive impact 
on TFP growth among relative laggards in the respective industries, this impact was more than 
overwhelmed by the inability of industrial leaders to leapfrog their competitors.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the conceptual 
framework and empirical specification for our analysis of the two different post-liberalization 
determinants of TFP growth-employment reallocation and competitive pressure.  The data is   7
described in some detail in Section 3. The results from decomposing productivity into labor 
reallocation and non-reallocation factors are reported in Section 4, while Section 5 highlights the 
regression results from our analysis of the impact of increased competitive pressure on TFP 
growth.  Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.ANALYTICAL PARADIGM 
2.1. Productivity decompositions 
           Suppose that the average unweighted firm-level productivity for an industry in period t 
is t P
_
. If we denote the deviation of the productivity of the i-th firm from this average by t i P P
_
−  
the difference would be positive for firms that are more productive than the average, and negative 
for firms less productive than the average. Let, on the other hand, the deviation of the 
employment weight of the i-th firm in the industry from the employment weight of the average 
firm in the industry be 
_
t i W W − .  
    As demonstrated by Olley and Pakes (1996), the weighted average productivity of the 
industry would be given by the following: 
 
[1]                             ) )( (
_ _ _
t i t i i t t P P W W P P − − Σ + =   
If the covariance  ) )( (
_ _
t i t i i P P W W − − Σ is positive, firms whose productivity is higher than 
average account for the majority of the employment in the industry, and vice versa in the case 
when the cross product is negative.  
       The Olley-Pakes decomposition indicates whether or not more productive firms are gaining 
at the expense of the less productive firms. But it does not differentiate between the individual 
contribution of resource reallocation and factors that are not related to resource reallocation on   8
productivity growth. This dual impact of liberalization on firm-level productivity is captured by 
the Griliches-Regev decomposition. 
        Suppose that a firm’s productivity changes from  t P to  1 + t P  between periods t and t+1, while 
its weight within the industry changes from  t W to 1 + t W . This would lead to a change in the firm’s 
contribution to the industry’s productivity from  t tP W  to  1 1 + + t t P W . Griliches and Regev (1995) 
argued that since this change in the firm’s contribution to the industry’s productivity can be 
accounted for by a change in the firm’s productivity and/ or a change in the firm’s weight, the 
following relationship must hold: 
 
[2]                       dWP WdP P W P W t t t t + = − + + 1 1  
 
where dP refers to a change in productivity, given the weight of the firm within the industry 
(W), and dW refers to a change of the firm’s weight within the industry, given its productivity (P). 
      It is easy to see that the overall productivity of an industry can increase either because of 
an increase in the productivity of an average firm belonging to the industry, or because of the 
increase in the share/ weight of the more productive firms within the industry. If, for example, 
resources, in our case labor, reallocate towards more productive firms within the industry, 
industrial productivity would increase on account of the “between” changes in productivity. If, on 
the other hand, liberalization and the ensuing competition render the firms more productive, the 
increase in the overall (weighted) productivity of the industry follows on account of “within” firm 
changes in the industry.  
 
2.2. The impact of competitive pressure on TFP growth 
In trying to disentangle the remaining developing country dilemmas related to the impact 
of competitive pressure on TFP growth, we use a fairly stylized empirical model, a direct   9
empirical counterpart of some of the cutting edge recent theories of the impact of competition and 
distance from the technological frontier on TFP growth (Griffithh, Redding and Simpson, 2003; 
Konings and Vanderbussche, 2004; Aghion et al, 2005):  
  
[3]                 1 3 2 1 0 − + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ it jt jt it DIST HERF IMP TFP β β β β  
                                          it it jt it jt DIST HERF DIST IMP η β β + ∆ + ∆ + − − 1 5 1 4 * *  
 
where  it TFP ∆  stands for the change in  it TFP  between each two successive years. 
jt IMP ∆  and  jt HERF ∆  are the respective changes in import penetration and industrial market 
concentration, which are stylized measures of product market competition from abroad and in the 
domestic market (Roberts and Tybout, 1996; Tybout, 2000).  
We also define a variable capturing the distance between each firm and the technological 
leader in a given national sector j, namely the ratio of firm i’s TFP relative to the maximum TFP 
level in sector j (Griffith, Redding and Simpson, 2002; Konings and Vanderbussche, 2004; 
Aghion et al, 2005): 





DIST = , 
 
In the two extreme cases, a distance close to 1 indicates that a domestic firm is close to the 
technological frontier in the respective industrial sector of the national economy, while a distance 
of 0 indicates that it is significantly less efficient than the domestic technological leader. By 
interacting this variable with our measures of internal and foreign product market competition, we 
attempt to identify differential influence of product market competition on the behaviour of firms 
belonging to different positions of the national technological frontier.   10
  As argued at the outset, the hypotheses related to this specification are not 
straightforward.  To begin with, there are arguments to suggest that increased product market 
competition exerts downward pressure on costs, reduces slack, provides incentives for efficient 
organization of production and even drives innovation forward (Nickell 1996; Levinsohn, 1993). 
When increased competitive pressure is a result of an inflow of superior imports from abroad, 
technological diffusion may lead to a further boost in TFP growth (Eaton and Kortum, 1996, 
1997; Bernard and Jones, 1996).  In other words,  1 β  >0 and  2 β >0. 
These arguments are challenged by theories that allow for either backward bending labor 
supply curve of incumbent entrepreneurs (Corden, 1974) or absence of a frictionless entry and 
exit into the industry (Rodrik, 1992) both of which place significant barriers to the rationalization 
of production. Improved corporate governance and innovation could be further aggravated in an 
environment of macroeconomic instability and credit crunch, which precludes the adequate 
financing of innovative activities (Rodrik, 1992; Aghion et al, 2005A; Aghion et al, 2006). In 
sum, both theoretical and empirical evidence provide support to insignificant or even negative 
values of  1 β  and  2 β . 
  While the direction of the immediate impact of increased competitive pressure on TFP 
growth is therefore difficult to predict, recent theories of imitation and innovation argue in favour 
of TFP growth among firms closest to the technological frontier, i.e.  4 β >0,  5 β  >0 (Aghion et al, 
1997; Aghion et al, 2001; Aghion et al, 2005A). Specifically, in an environment where laggards 
are capable of imitating and hence moving in a step-by-step fashion towards the technological 
leader, the threat of neck-and-neck competition pushes the leader to innovate. In the specific case 
of a boost in foreign competition, mature domestic firms close to the technological frontier are 
likely to benefit from the efficiency enhancing pressure of increased imports, even if enhanced 
foreign competition may hurt domestic laggards (Konings and Vanderbussche, 2004).    11
  While these theories have found a sound empirical backing in the context of developed 
economies we are not aware of tests of these hypotheses in the context of a developing country.  
This omission is surprising, as a case could easily be made for their rejection in a less developed 
context. For instance, while firms close to the technological frontier in developed countries are 
also close to the world technological frontier and hence capable of benefiting from efficiency 
enhancing neck-and-neck competition with foreign products, firms at the national frontier of a 
developing country may be far away from the world technological frontier and incapable of either 
innovating or imitating sufficiently to reach the world technological leader. They may therefore 
face higher probability of being displaced by imports or foreign investors in the domestic market 
than leapfrog these foreign competitors, especially in the case when macroeconomic instability 
and credit crunch makes the financing of new projects difficult. In other words, we allow for the 
possibility of rejection of the hypothesis of a positive impact of both increased competitive 
pressure in general, and improved innovative activities of firms close to the national technological 
frontier in particular, in the context of a less developed economy.    
 
3. DATA 
The data for the analysis have largely been obtained from the Amadeus data base 
ii which we use 
for our production function estimations. Following the established practice related to TFP 
estimations based on the Amadeus data base (Konings, VanCayseele and Warsynski, 2005 and 
Konings and Vanderbussche, 2004) we use the firm level annual value of operating revenues as a 
proxy for output; the value of firm level tangible fixed assets as a proxy for fixed capital; and the 
number of employees and material costs, as proxies for the labor and intermediate inputs, 
respectively. The Amadeus data were also used to generate Herfindahl indices for all NACE 2-
digit industries. These indices are a stylized proxy for the degree of domestic competition at the 
industry level. The Amadeus data were supplemented with import penetration indices obtained   12
from the National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, import penetration being the stylized proxy for 
competition from foreign firms at the industry level.  
         Despite the absence of change in criteria for inclusion of firms in the Amadeus data base, 
our original sample indicates a 10-time increase in the number of firms between 1995 and 2001. 
This trend is inconsistent with the anecdotal evidence of a rather low level of entry of de novo 
firms in the Bulgarian manufacturing sector (Rutkowski, 2003) and might therefore be indicative 
of a high degree of shedding of existing firms into numerous micro affiliates, not necessarily 
indicative of corresponding job creation and productivity enhancement
 iii. To find an answer to 
this apparent puzzle, we experimented with the data using four different types of samples, namely 
(i) a full sample, (ii) a sample cleaned from outliers, (iii) a sample restricted to firms of more than 
1 employee each, and (iv) a sample restricted to firms of more than 10 employees each.  
  While our results across these three different sets of estimates are not contradictory, we 
obtain the best fit and highest level of consistency across specifications with the use of the sample 
of 10 or more employees, and hence report the results based on this sample. The sample 
restriction is consistent with the conventional practice in employment and productivity related 
studies around the world and is comparable to studies based on official national databases of 
population of firms in emerging economies. Most importantly, it allows us to distinguish 
conventional firms or entrepreneurs from self-employed/ own account individuals whose 
behaviour is typically indicative of hidden unemployment (Leidholm and Mead, 1987; Earle and 
Sakova, 2000). In each year, our working sample of firms that hire at least 10 employees covers 
more than 60 percent of the Bulgarian industrial employment (see Appendix 1 for comparison of 
the coverage of the restricted Amadeus sample used with national statistics; for further 
comprehensive overviews of the data see Konings, VanCayseele and Warsynski, 2005 and 
Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2003). 
                    The main disadvantage of the Amadeus data set is the difficulty in appropriately 
identifying entering and exiting firms and basing the analysis explicitly on the contribution of   13
those firms to productivity growth (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2003).  For example, as 
companies exit or stop reporting their financial statements, Amadeus reports the status of these 
companies as “not available or missing” for 4 years, and they are removed from the database after 
the 5
th year of non-reporting; such that the 2001 data base does not include firms that exited prior 
to 1998. This peculiarity is unlikely to bias our results, given the relatively few incidents of 
bankruptcy in the Bulgarian manufacturing sectors prior to the crisis of 1996-97 and the ensuing 
radical liberalization (Commission of the European Communities, 2001, World Bank, 2001). 
However, it certainly precludes the explicit focus on the impact of entry and exit on productivity, 
moreover that a large number of missing observations on the date of incorporation, makes it 
difficult to properly record new entries.  
This latter problem is further exacerbated by the fact that even when this information is 
available, we are unable to ascertain whether the date of incorporation accounts for the actual 
entry of a new firm in the industry or is a result of a merger or splitting of firms into different 
entities. We therefore concentrate on employment reallocation and productivity trends in 
predominantly surviving firms, many of which entered the market between 1995 and 2001 and a 
few of which exited the market during the same period. The descriptive statistics, based on an 
unbalanced panel of 5885 Bulgarian firms are reported in Table 1. All relevant variables 
(operating revenues, fixed capital and material costs) are expressed in terms of the 1995 real 
levels of the Bulgarian national currency, i.e., the lev, with the use of 2-digit sectoral PPIs 
obtained from the National Statistical Institute. They indicate the following: 
 
      << Insert Table 1 about here>> 
 
•  Operating revenues in the Bulgarian manufacturing sector declined monotonically over 
time and this trend was followed by downward adjustment of the value of material costs. 
At the same time, the manufacturing sector saw fixed capital fluctuations. Specifically, in   14
the crisis year 1996, the mean value of fixed capital declined by 67 percent.  In 1997, it 
saw a slight recovery, perhaps as a result of investment inflow during the privatization. It 
then continued to fall till 2001.  
•  An average firm in the Bulgarian manufacturing sector experienced reduction in its 
number of employees, implying large scale redundancies subsequent to structural reform. 
The only period which saw a slight increase in average employment was the crisis period 
1996-1997, an observation, consistent with the finding of Rutkowski (1999) and Dimova, 
Gang and Landon-Lane (2004) in that (state- owned) firms created jobs and provided a 
buffer for significant proportion of the population during the crisis. 
•  The statistics also highlight an impressive increase in the extent of both domestic and 
foreign competition in the Bulgarian manufacturing sector in the aftermath of the crisis 
and radical structural reform. Specifically, during 1995-2001, the Herfindahl index 
declined from 0.1455 to 0.0288 and the import penetration index increased from 0.2848 
to 0.4486.  
           The data were first used to generate Total Factor Productivity (TFP) estimates as a residual 
from production function estimation. To calculate TFP, we use the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) 
methodology, which has several advantages over alternative methodologies. A brief overview of 
the methodology, justification of its use and OLS and LP production function estimates for both 
the manufacturing sector as a whole and individual industries, are reported in Appendix II. A 
comparison of the OLS and LP coefficient estimates indicate that these estimates move in the 
direction of successful elimination of the expected simultaneity bias (e.g., Pavcnik, 2002; 
Konings and DeLoecker, 2006). Specifically, Table A1 indicates that the OLS estimates of the 
labor variable are generally overestimated vis-à-vis the LP estimates, while the OLS estimates of 
the capital variable are in general underestimated when compared to the LP estimates. This 
pattern is consistent with the theoretical assumption that the freely variable labor is typically easy 
to adjust by hiring more labor when a positive shock takes place and shedding labor when a   15
negative shock takes place. At the same time, firms with higher capital stock are more likely to 
remain in the market when a negative shock takes place thus leading to a negative bias of the 
OLS estimate of capital. We therefore go on to derive TFP as the residual from our LP production 
function and base the rest of our analysis on this productivity measure.  
<< Insert Figure 1 about here>> 
                      Figure 1 highlights the development of (the median) TFP over time. We observe a 
significant TFP decline over the crisis period of 1996-97, followed by substantial recovery in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis, possibly on account of macro stabilization and FDI inflow, and 
then a new trough in the environment of massive liberalization before reaching a relative stability 
at a level lower than that preceding the crisis. It will become clear from the description of our 
decomposition results that the intra-industry trends in TFP growth are consistent with this general 
trend. In sum, although the short span of the panel precludes generalization about the long run 
impact of liberalization on TFP, our preliminary look at the TFP evolution does indicate an 
absence of recovery at least half a decade subsequent to the macro-financial crisis and initiation 
of radical structural reform, including a massive FDI inflow. The rest of the paper is devoted to 
the explanation of this phenomenon.  
 
4. DECOMPOSITION RESULTS 
As a first step in our analysis we use the Olley-Pakes and Griliches-Regev 
decomposition, in order to account for the potential influence of resource reallocation on TFP 
growth in the context of economic liberalization. To recapitulate, both methodologies are based 
on a weighted measure of productivity with the weight indicating the share of industrial labor by 
firms belonging to different portions of the industrial productivity distribution. By choosing the 
share of industrial employment we concentrate on the reallocation of labor across firms of 
different productivity levels. A positive covariance term in the Olley-Pakes decomposition 
indicates reallocation of employment towards more productive firms in the respective industries,   16
while a larger absolute value of the between than within component of the Grilichev-Regev 
decomposition indicates a higher impact of labor reallocation, as opposed to firm and industry 
factors, on growth in total factor productivity. 
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
Table 2 reports the Olley-Pakes decomposition results. Column 1 in Table 2 highlights 
the respective weighted productivity measures in each industry and year (the left-hand side 
variable in equation [1]), column 2 highlights the unweighted productivity measures (the first 
right-hand side term in equation [1]) and column 3 highlights the covariance term (the second 
right-hand side term in equation [1]) Except for the electrical and optical equipment sector in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis, namely the values of – 0.0243 in 1997 and -0.2439 in 1998, the 
covariance term in the Olley-Pakes decomposition is positive for each year and industry in 
Bulgaria. This indicates that labor reallocated towards more productive firms in the 
manufacturing sector during the whole period.  Note that our productivity measure is total factor 
productivity. Hence labor reallocation towards more productive firms in our context indicates 
labor reallocation towards technologically more advanced firms within the respective industries. 
In other words, the Olley- Pakes results are consistent with the assumption of productivity 
enhancing and skill upgrading process of creative destruction in the Bulgarian manufacturing 
sector in the context of liberalization.  
            Our  Olley-Pakes  results  also support our preliminary evidence that an average 
manufacturing firm in Bulgaria experienced total factor productivity decline in the majority of 
sectors and years. For instance, the weighted value of TFP in the food industry declines from 6.16 
in 1995 to 5.67 in 2001, while the weighted value of TFP in the electric and optical industry 
declines from 5.34 in 1995 to 4.69 in 1998 before recovering to 5.24 in 2001. In virtually all 
industries the post 1999 values of TFP are lower than the respective values in 1995.  
<< Insert Table 3 about here>>   17
To explore this phenomenon further we take a look at the determinants of the weighted 
component of total factor productivity change with the use of our Grilichev- Regev 
decomposition, the results from which are reported in Table 3 
iv. Column 3 of Table 3 highlights 
the change in the weighted value of the productivity variable (the left-hand side variable in 
equation [2]) Column 1 reports the between value of the productivity decomposition (the first 
right- hand side term in equation [2]) while column 2 reports the within value of the productivity 
decomposition (the second right-hand side term in equation [2]). 
These results indicate that in all industries and years the absolute value of the within 
component is significantly higher than the absolute value of the between component. For 
example, in the wood industry the 1995-1996 between term of 8.03E-09 is substantially lower 
than the within term of -0.1641. In other words, total factor productivity growth, in the majority 
of the cases negative, was primarily driven by characteristics other than labor reallocation. The 
impact of the efficiency inhibiting within characteristics often overwhelmed the positive impact 
of efficiency enhancing labor reallocation between each two successive years.  In sum, the 
decomposition results provide further support to our earlier statement that in 1995-2001 Bulgaria 
continued to be in a state of transition disequilibrium and productivity enhancement and 
technological upgrading by way of X-efficiency improvements and investment in R&D were yet 
to come. It is therefore important to address explicitly the direct impact of within industry factors 
like increased competitive pressure on total factor productivity.  
 
5. REGRESSION RESULTS 
 The estimates based on equation [3] and the respective Huber-White standard errors, 
after controlling for industry and firm effects, are reported in Table 4.  The first column of Table 
4 reports the coefficient estimates from the base specification. The impact of yearly dummy 
variables is included in column 2, thus accounting among other things for the impact of   18
macroeconomic volatility on TFP growth. Finally, the impact of both yearly and industry 
dummies is accounted for in column 3.  
To recapitulate, the theoretical literature provides us with soft hypotheses that the 
pressure from both domestic and foreign competition has a positive impact on TFP growth 
( 1 β >0,  2 β  >0) and is likely to be strongest among firms closest to the industrial technological 
leader ( 4 β >0,  5 β  >0;  4 β > 1 β ,  5 β  > 2 β ). We allow for the rejection of these hypotheses in a 
less developed economy context, especially one marked by macroeconomic instability and credit 
crunch.  
<< Insert Table 4 about here>> 
Looking first at the results from the base equation, reported in column 1, we see that the 
coefficient of the change in import penetration variable is + 1.85 and significant at the 1% level, 
while the coefficient of the change in Herfindahl index is –0.6694 and once again significant at 
the 1% level. In other words, the increase in both foreign competitive pressure by way of imports 
and domestic competitive pressure by way of a decrease in industrial concentration have a 
positive impact on firm-level TFP growth. These observations are consistent with theories and 
evidence of a positive impact of increased competitive pressure on TFP growth by way of either 
X-efficiency improvement or imitation and technological diffusion.  
At the same time, the coefficient of the interaction term of the change in the import 
penetration variable with our measure of distance from the technological frontier is –2.6416. As 
our distance variable takes higher values the closest a firm is to the technological leader this 
indicates that firms closest to the frontier are the ones most hurt by increased import penetration. 
Indeed, the difference of  -0.78 between the coefficient of the interaction term of the import 
penetration variable and the distance variable (-2.64) and the coefficient of the un-interacted 
import penetration variable (1.86) highlights a net negative impact of 0.78 of increase in import 
penetration on the TFP growth of firms closest to the industrial technological leaders.    19
The results on the net impact of increase in domestic competition on firms close to the 
technological frontier convey a similar message. Specifically, the coefficient of the interaction 
term between the change in the Herfindahl index variable and the distance from the frontier 
variable is +1.55. The net effect of a decrease in industrial concentration (or increase in domestic 
product market competition) of 0.88 (1.55-0.6699) thus indicates that firms closest to the 
technological leader were the one hurt most from the increase in domestic competition.  
Once we control for year and industry effects (columns 2 and 3 of Table 4) we see that 
the direct positive impact of import penetration on growth in TFP decreases (from 1.86 in column 
1 to 1.31 in column 3), while the positive impact of increase in domestic competition on TFP 
growth increases (from 0.6699 in column 1 to 1.01 in column 3). At the same time the net 
negative impact of increased foreign competition on firms closest to the technological leader goes 
up to 1 once yearly effects are taken into account (column 2), and to 1.04 once both yearly and 
industrial effects are taken into account (column 3). The same is true for the net negative impact 
of increased domestic competition on TFP growth, with the difference between the coefficients of 
the interaction term of change in the Herfindahl index and the non-interacted change in 
Herfindahl index variable increasing from 0.88 in column 1 to 1.7 in column 2 and 1.33 in 
column 3.  
The observations related to the impact of competition on firms near the technological 
frontier in Bulgaria contradict evidence from developed economies, which shows that firms 
closest to the technological frontier are the ones most likely to realize fully the positive impact of 
increased competitive pressure.  As argued in section 2, these contradictions are not difficult to 
explain in the context of a less developed country. It is plausible to assume that the technological 
gap between domestic and overseas competitors in Bulgaria is large enough such that the firms on 
the national technological frontier lag behind foreign competitors enough to be discouraged to 
catch up with the world leader and the catching up process is likely to be especially difficult in 
the context of macroeconomic uncertainty and credit market failure.  This, while a more liberal   20
economic environment may have made it easier for laggards to imitate and improve their 
corporate governance enough to move towards the respective national leaders, firms that have 
reached the local frontier and exhausted the domestic technological capacity may find it difficult 
to leapfrog their superior foreign competitors. 
External trade statistics are not inconsistent with this logic. They indicate that in the 
1990s Bulgarian firms faced significant (and indeed increasing) competition from technologically 
superior overseas products and this may have decreased their incentives to innovate or even 
forced them to downsize and exit the market. Specifically, in the second half of the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s, imports from OECD countries, such as EU member states and the USA 
took a significant proportion of the Bulgarian import basket. For example, between 1997 and 
2001 imports from main OECD partner countries increased from 26.7 to 36 %. During the same 
period, the proportion of technologically superior products such as chemicals, manufactured 
goods and machinery and equipment was highest and indeed increased from 45.3 to 57.5 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2004). The same argument could be brought 
forward vis-a-vis the increase of internal competition. It is plausible that the entry of foreign 
multinationals hit hardest the potential domestic competitors, close enough to the domestic 
technological frontier but still lagging behind the foreign entrants.  
Before concluding it is perhaps worthwhile highlighting several potential econometric 
problems, despite the fact that, as emphasized on several occasions, our specification is a direct 
and fairly stylized empirical counterpart of a widely used theoretical model. To begin with, one 
could argue that the results may be driven by a high level of correlation by our different measures 
of product market competition, namely import penetration and the Herfindahl index. However, in 
our case, the correlation coefficient of only 0.10 between these variables indicates that this 
argument does not hold. The correlation coefficient between either of these variables and the 
distance from the frontier variable is even smaller, less than 1%, and the absence of 
multicollinearity is further obviated by the relatively low value of the Rsq, which is similar to that   21
of similar studies of changes in TFP based on comparable sample sizes (Pavcnik, 2002; Konings 
and Vanderbussche, 2004).  
To avoid the possible endogeneity of our distance from the frontier variable, we have 
taken the lagged value of this variable.  At the same time, the endogeneity of the changes in 
Herfindahl index and import penetration index is unlikely, given that our left hand side variable is 
measured at the firm level, while these two right hand side variables are measured at the industry 
level 
v. Finally, the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity/ fixed effects is accounted for by 
estimating our model in first differences.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The different channels through which liberalization can stimulate firm and industry level TFP 
growth have long been of significant interest to economists. But although economic theory has 
almost unambiguously supported a positive link between a fairly liberalized environment and 
increase in productivity, empirical evidence has failed to reach a consensus. To begin with, 
although few economists disagree that liberalization stimulates a better allocation of resources in 
developed economies, it is argued that crisis- prone less developed industrial settings may 
contribute to the exit of fairly efficient producers and survival of fairly inefficient producers in 
the context of liberalization Furthermore, while there is evidence to suggest that increased 
competitive pressure improves the innovative potential of at least frontier firms in developed 
economies, evidence from developing countries often argues against this logic. 
  In this paper we address some of the controversies related to the impact of liberalization 
on TFP growth in a less developed country by exploring the impact of labor allocation and 
increased competitive pressure on TFP growth in the Bulgarian manufacturing sector. We find 
that while in the environment of rapid liberalization labor reallocated from less efficient to more 
efficient firms in virtually all manufacturing sectors, the impact of labor reallocation on TFP 
growth was negligible compared to the influence of other within industry factors. Furthermore,   22
although both foreign and domestic competition had a positive impact on the TFP growth of 
relative laggards in the domestic industries, this positive impact was more than overwhelmed by 
the failure of domestic leaders to innovate and boost their TFP. This pattern is consistent with 
experience of other liberalizing developing countries like Egypt and Yugoslavia which find that 
while liberalization can stimulate the improved performance of firms in general, it doesn’t 
necessarily improve the ability of national technological leaders to leapfrog (foreign) competition. 
The failure of firms in developing countries to innovate is especially easy to explain in the 
context of macroeconomic instability and credit crunch, which often precludes the sponsoring of 
new projects.  
  Despite the failure to find evidence of a growth in TFP in the context of rapid 
liberalization of the Bulgarian economy, even in the aftermath of structural reform and significant 
inflow of FDI, our results cannot be interpreted as arguments against liberalization even amidst 
macro-financial instability. On the one hand, we do find evidence in favor of improved allocative 
efficiency and productivity-improving practices at least among laggards in the domestic 
industries. One the other hand, the short span of the period under consideration and inevitable fir 
a single study failure to capture all possible components of liberalization such as increased export 
potential and import of cheaper inputs, makes our analysis somewhat restrictive.  Our results, and 
indeed similar evidence from other developing countries, do indicate however that any policy 
making effort to enhance the long term growth potential of a developing country should take 
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i In compliance with its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitment Bulgaria reduced its tariff 
rates to an average of 27 percent, and the import surcharge was removed a year ahead of schedule 
on January 1, 1999. During the same year, around 85 percent of the Bulgarian imports from the 
EU were not subject to tariffs. The tariff rate on the remaining products decreased to 30 percent 
of the basic rate in 2000, 15 percent of the basic rate in 2001 and was finally reduced to zero in 
2002. The process of liberalization was further institutionalized by way of enactment of the 
Protection of Competition Act, leading to the harmonization of Bulgaria’s competition policy 
with that of the EU. 
 
ii The data base is collected and distributed by Bureau Van Dijk, a firm listed on the Brussels 
Stock exchange, specialized in harmonizing company account data for European firms. Before 
1999 the Amadeus set was available in annual CDROM editions including information on the 
medium and large European companies, i.e. those satisfying at least one of the following criteria: 
employment greater than 100, or total assets of more than 8 million USD, or sales exceeding 16 
million USD. Since 1999 the coverage of the Amadeus data set has increased to encompass small 
and medium enterprises.   
 
iii We thank Paul Walsh for this explanation, based on on-going research at Trinity College 
Dublin, Ireland. The authors are able to establish whether newly registered firms are really de 
novo firms, or affiliates of former conglomerates, which have registered as separate entities. The 
preliminary results indicate that the absence of productivity changes in the aftermath of increase 
in the number of firms in the economy is indeed driven by an absence of increase in productive 
heterogeneity due to the fact that traditional firms have simply split into several different entities.   24
 
iv Note that the changes in the weighted value of TFP reported in column 3 of Table 3 are the 
respective differences in the weighted TFP values reported in column 1 of Table 2 between each 
two successive years. 
 
v Specifically, while both the industrial concentration and import penetration may be driven by 
the distribution of firm characteristics that determine industry level TFP, they are unlikely to be 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 



































































































1755 2113 2189 3480 3916 4207 4549 
Note: 1. All relevant figures are expressed in millions of real 1995 Bulgarian Levs with                  
the use of 3-digit sectoral  PPIs.   
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year Weighted Unweighted Covariance year Weighted Unweighted Covariance
1995 6.1570 5.8670 0.2900 1995 5.8189 5.2768 0.5421
1996 6.3105 5.6588 0.6517 1996 5.8232 5.0222 0.8010
1997 5.8998 5.4606 0.4392 1997 5.3675 4.8221 0.5454
1998 5.9226 5.6209 0.3017 1998 5.6609 5.3863 0.2746
1999 5.7816 5.1615 0.6201 1999 5.4327 5.0510 0.3817
2000 5.6836 5.1035 0.5800 2000 5.5532 5.1980 0.3552
2001 5.6737 5.0425 0.6312 2001 5.4423 5.0535 0.3888
1995 5.3155 5.0518 0.2637 1995 5.6598 5.2048 0.4550
1996 5.6564 5.1715 0.4849 1996 5.7529 5.1924 0.5605
1997 5.3191 5.0143 0.3048 1997 5.4016 4.8379 0.5637
1998 5.3387 5.0831 0.2555 1998 5.4503 5.0625 0.3878
1999 5.2174 4.8278 0.3897 1999 5.2653 4.9442 0.3211
2000 5.3584 4.9571 0.4013 2000 5.2037 4.8752 0.3285
2001 5.3172 4.9049 0.4122 2001 5.4267 4.8890 0.5378
1995 5.4848 5.2940 0.1908 1995 6.0384 5.2140 0.8244
1996 5.9173 5.4790 0.4383 1996 6.3544 5.4624 0.8920
1997 5.5594 5.2266 0.3328 1997 6.1231 5.2221 0.9011
1998 5.0886 4.9728 0.1159 1998 5.9888 5.3916 0.5972
1999 5.1089 4.7847 0.3242 1999 5.6466 5.1719 0.4747
2000 5.2822 4.8072 0.4750 2000 6.0534 5.2344 0.8190
2001 5.2777 4.8215 0.4562 2001 5.9388 5.1524 0.7864
1995 5.7123 5.2801 0.4322 1995 5.5659 5.0735 0.4924
1996 5.8245 5.1160 0.7085 1996 5.8087 5.2388 0.5700
1997 5.4760 5.2141 0.2619 1997 5.5726 5.0356 0.5371
1998 5.4950 5.3005 0.1945 1998 5.7154 5.3490 0.3664
1999 5.1433 4.8726 0.2707 1999 5.6123 5.1534 0.4589
2000 5.2283 4.8055 0.4228 2000 5.5350 5.1752 0.3598
2001 5.3355 4.7908 0.5448 2001 5.6041 5.1295 0.4747
1995 5.6114 5.4883 0.1231 1995 5.3433 5.1795 0.1638
1996 5.7212 5.3709 0.3503 1996 5.2947 5.1603 0.1344
1997 5.4113 5.3703 0.0410 1997 5.0039 5.0283 -0.0243
1998 5.8532 5.8492 0.0040 1998 4.6943 4.9382 -0.2439
1999 5.6168 5.2851 0.3317 1999 5.1042 5.0984 0.0058
2000 5.6007 5.2674 0.3333 2000 5.1558 5.1360 0.0198
2001 5.5163 5.1271 0.3891 2001 5.2426 5.2358 0.0067
1995 7.0253 6.3448 0.6805 1995 5.4470 5.0932 0.3538
1996 6.5414 6.0288 0.5126 1996 5.7021 5.0188 0.6833
1997 7.0811 6.0657 1.0154 1997 5.0433 4.6547 0.3887
1998 6.6001 6.0446 0.5555 1998 5.0387 4.8045 0.2342
1999 6.7274 5.9801 0.7473 1999 5.1165 4.8196 0.2969
2000 7.0876 6.0710 1.0166 2000 5.1473 4.8180 0.3294
2001 6.8652 5.7000 1.1652 2001 5.3289 4.9037 0.4251
1995 6.1219 5.5914 0.5305 1995 5.2983 5.2095 0.0888
1996 6.5532 5.8093 0.7439 1996 5.0973 4.9581 0.1392
1997 6.1735 5.4894 0.6841 1997 4.8407 4.7372 0.1036
1998 5.9618 5.4966 0.4651 1998 4.7051 4.6807 0.0244
1999 5.7907 5.1761 0.6146 1999 4.7021 4.5221 0.1800
2000 6.1136 5.2963 0.8173 2000 4.9366 4.7332 0.2034
2001 6.0072 5.1795 0.8277 2001 4.8969 4.5832 0.3137
Chemicals
Leather & Leather Products
Wood & Wood Products
Pulp, Paper, Publishing









Food, Beverages & Tobacco
Textiles and Apparel  32
 
year between within total year between within total
1995-96 -7.49E-08 -0.2082 -0.2082 1995-96 2.20E-08 -0.2546 -0.2546
1996-97 8.10E-08 -0.1982 -0.1982 1996-97 -5.98E-08 -0.2001 -0.2001
1997-98 -2.54E-08 0.1604 0.1604 1997-98 5.99E-08 0.5642 0.5642
1998-99 -2.29E-08 -0.4594 -0.4594 1998-99 6.66E-08 -0.3353 -0.3353
1999-00 -3.86E-09 -0.0580 -0.0580 1999-00 5.80E-09 0.1470 0.1470
2000-01 2.37E-08 -0.0610 -0.0610 2000-01 -3.84E-08 -0.1445 -0.1445
1995-96 -1.13E-08 0.1197 0.1197 1995-96 2.75E-08 -0.0124 -0.0124
1996-97 -5.96E-09 -0.1572 -0.1572 1996-97 -4.01E-08 -0.3545 -0.3545
1997-98 9.24E-10 0.0688 0.0688 1997-98 4.13E-08 0.2246 0.2246
1998-99 -1.74E-09 -0.2553 -0.2553 1998-99 -6.53E-08 -0.1183 -0.1183
1999-00 -6.99E-09 0.1293 0.1293 1999-00 -5.24E-08 -0.0690 -0.0690
2000-01 2.21E-08 -0.0522 -0.0522 2000-01 3.92E-08 0.0138 0.0138
1995-96 1.86E-08 0.1849 0.1849 1995-96 6.00E-08 0.2484 0.2484
1996-97 -1.68E-08 -0.2524 -0.2524 1996-97 -9.18E-08 -0.2403 -0.2403
1997-98 -2.84E-08 -0.2538 -0.2538 1997-98 4.66E-08 0.1696 0.1696
1998-99 1.01E-07 -0.1881 -0.1881 1998-99 -4.46E-08 -0.2197 -0.2197
1999-00 4.60E-08 0.0225 0.0225 1999-00 1.16E-07 0.0625 0.0625
2000-01 -1.11E-07 0.0142 0.0142 2000-01 -9.94E-08 -0.0820 -0.0820
1995-96 8.03E-09 -0.1641 -0.1641 1995-96 5.70E-09 0.1653 0.1653
1996-97 -2.29E-08 0.0981 0.0981 1996-97 -4.67E-08 -0.2032 -0.2032
1997-98 -3.80E-08 0.0864 0.0864 1997-98 4.19E-08 0.3135 0.3135
1998-99 2.62E-08 -0.4280 -0.4280 1998-99 -1.53E-08 -0.1956 -0.1956
1999-00 2.40E-08 -0.0670 -0.0670 1999-00 3.71E-08 0.0218 0.0218
2000-01 -1.68E-08 -0.0148 -0.0148 2000-01 -3.18E-08 -0.0458 -0.0458
1995-96 1.13E-08 -0.1174 -0.1174 1995-96 -5.55E-08 -0.0192 -0.0192
1996-97 -6.87E-09 -0.0006 -0.0006 1996-97 8.58E-08 -0.1320 -0.1320
1997-98 8.56E-09 0.4790 0.4790 1997-98 -6.25E-08 -0.0901 -0.0901
1998-99 1.42E-08 -0.5641 -0.5641 1998-99 -8.41E-08 0.1602 0.1602
1999-00 -7.41E-08 -0.0178 -0.0178 1999-00 9.69E-08 0.0376 0.0376
2000-01 6.11E-08 -0.1402 -0.1402 2000-01 -3.31E-08 0.0998 0.0998
1995-96 8.79E-09 -0.3160 -0.3160 1995-96 1.04E-08 -0.0744 -0.0744
1996-97 -7.43E-08 0.0369 0.0369 1996-97 -4.65E-08 -0.3641 -0.3641
1997-98 9.78E-08 -0.0211 -0.0211 1997-98 -1.35E-08 0.1498 0.1498
1998-99 3.52E-08 -0.0645 -0.0645 1998-99 -1.84E-08 0.0151 0.0151
1999-00 2.01E-07 0.0909 0.0909 1999-00 9.35E-08 -0.0016 -0.0016
2000-01 -3.32E-07 -0.3710 -0.3710 2000-01 -1.16E-07 0.0858 0.0858
1995-96 5.64E-08 0.2178 0.2178 1995-96 9.97E-08 -0.2514 -0.2514
1996-97 -4.21E-08 -0.3199 -0.3199 1996-97 -9.50E-08 -0.2210 -0.2210
1997-98 2.85E-08 0.0072 0.0072 1997-98 -2.90E-08 -0.0565 -0.0565
1998-99 -2.64E-08 -0.3205 -0.3205 1998-99 8.99E-08 -0.1586 -0.1586
1999-00 -1.51E-08 0.1202 0.1202 1999-00 -1.91E-08 0.2111 0.2111

















Table 4: Regression Results 
 





































Years No  Yes***  Yes*** 
Industries No  No  Yes*** 
 
Rsq 0.0549  0.1050  0.1306 
N  Observations  11562 11562 11562 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % level, respectively. The figures 
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Appendix I 
Table A1: Representativeness of the  Amadeus Sample 
  





1995 531615 770421  69 
1996 509581 728106  70 
1997 449809 720285  62 
1998 427588 689748  62 
1999 524511 615829  85 
2000 483232 562331  86 
2001 477242 609460  78 
* Data source: National Statistical Institute (2005) Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria.  
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Appendix II 
One of the most controversial issues in estimating production functions is the appropriate 
treatment of the correlation between unobservable productivity shocks and input levels 
(Marshack and Andrews, 1994; Griliches and Mareisse, 1998). Specifically, firms facing positive 
productivity shocks are likely to respond by increasing their input use, while firms facing 
negative productivity shocks are likely to decrease their use of inputs. It is evident that OLS 
estimates of the production function would be biased and result in biased estimates of total factor 
productivity. 
           The literature dealing with this problem, has been trying to find an appropriate instrument 
which is correlated with the productivity shock, but not correlated with the rest of the inputs to 
the production function. One of the most popular methodologies, the Olley-Pakes (1996) (OP) 
methodology uses the inverted function of investments as an instrument for unobservable 
productivity shocks. It is challenged by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), which we find more 
appropriate in our case for several reasons. First, investments, used as part of the OP method, 
involve substantial adjustment costs and may therefore not respond smoothly to a productivity 
shock, violating the consistency condition (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). The smooth adaptability 
in our case is likely to be further aggravated by underdeveloped credit and financial markets, 
especially in the volatile economic environments of the Bulgarian economy in 1995 through 
2001. Secondly, the non-negativity of investments is a crucial precondition for inverting the 
investment function as part of the OP exercise. However, in our data samples, five percent of the 
Bulgarian firms report zero or negative investments in at least one of the years. Hence, the use of 
the OP methodology would involve a high degree of sample truncation, which we avoid with the 
choice of the alternative Levinsohn- Petrin (2003) (LP) methodology. This methodology uses 
material costs instead of investments as instrument for the unobserved productivity shock.  
Let the Cobb-Douglas function that we wish to estimate be:   36
[A1]                     t t t m t k t l t m k l y η ω β β β β + + + + + = 0 , 
where yt is the logarithm of firm’s output, lt and mt are the logarithms of freely variable inputs 
labor and intermediate inputs and kt is the logarithm of state variable capital.  The error term is 
decomposed into two components, the transmitted productivity component or shock ωt and white 
noise  ηt. It is obvious that the simultaneity problem mentioned earlier arises from the 
contemporaneous correlation of ωt with the input choices, producing biased OLS estimates.  
          The firm’s demand for intermediate inputs is: 
                                 ) , ( t t t t k m m ω =  
Under monotonicity conditions it can be inverted: 
                                 ) , ( t t t t m k ω ω =  
One can then rewrite [A1] as: 
[A2]                            t t t t t k t l t m k k l y η φ β β β + + + + = ) , ( 0 . 
                 
where  t t k t t t k m k η β β φ + + = 0 ) , ( . Robinson (1988) shows that this equation can be used to 
obtain consistent estimate of l β . Based on Robinson (1988) and OP, LP use a third-order 
polynomial approximation in kt and mt in place of  ) , ( t t t m k φ  in deriving the consistent labor 
estimate. This concludes the first stage of the LP estimation methodology.  
            In  the  second  stage  the  coefficient  of  capital k β is estimated. Since capital enters 
(.) φ twice, a more complete model is needed to identify k β . OP and LP assume that  t ω  follows a 
first-order Markov process and capital does not respond immediately to productivity innovations 
over last period expectations. Taking output net of labor gives: 
   37
[A3]                     
*
1 0
* ] | [ t t t t k t l t t E k l y y η ω ω β β β + + + = − = −   
Since both the productivity innovation and the white noise are uncorrelated with capital, 
regressing  
*
t y  on  kt  gives unbiased estimate of  k β . This concludes the second and final stage of 
the LP method.  
Table A2: Production Function Estimates 
 
Manufacturing sector  Labor  Capital 
  OLS LP  OLS LP 
























































































































Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***,**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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